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Iraq

Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 2367 (2017) (S/2017/881) [EN/AR]

Attachments

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2367 (2017), in which the Secretary-General was requested to report every three months on progress made towards fulfilling the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). The report covers key developments related to Iraq and provides an update on the activities of the United Nations in Iraq since my last report, which was issued on 11 July 2017 (S/2017/592), and the briefing of my Special Representative for Iraq to the Council on 17 July.

II. Summary of key political developments pertaining to Iraq

A. Political situation 2. On 25 September 2017, a unilaterally declared referendum on independence was held in the Kurdistan region of Iraq and in some areas outside the region that are disputed with the federal Government of Iraq, including Kirkuk Governorate.

The following question was posed in the referendum: “Do you agree to the independence of the Kurdistan region and the Kurdistani areas (disputed areas) outside the administration of the region, and the establishment of an independent State?” On the eve of the referendum, all the main political parties in the Kurdistan region endorsed a “yes” vote, with the exception of the Movement for Change (Gorran), which advised its supporters to make their own decision.

3. On 26 September, the President of the Kurdistan region of Iraq, Masoud Barzani, released a statement asserting that the vote had not been meant to impose a fait accompli or to draw borders but to provide a mandate for negotiations with Baghdad and to allow the people of the Kurdistan region of Iraq to express their stance on the issue of independence. He stressed that his Government was ready to immediately engage in negotiations on independence with Baghdad and called upon the Prime Minister of Iraq, Haider al-Abadi, to keep the door to dialogue open.

4. According to a statement by the Kurdistan Independent High Electoral and Referendum Commission on 27 September, 92.73 per cent of the 3,085,935 voters backed independence.

5. Reactions to the referendum at the federal level were immediate. On 26 September, the Council of Ministers ordered the suspension of all non-humanitarian, non-emergency international flights from the Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports, effective 29 September, until the Federal Border Port Authority and the Federal Civil Aviation Authority could establish control over the airports. The Council of Ministers also instructed the Port Authority to establish control over border crossings in the Kurdistan region of Iraq.

6. Also on 26 September, Mr. Al-Abadi repeated that the referendum had been illegal and unconstitutional, and had been held without international recognition. He pledged that the federal Government would uphold its authority in accordance with the Constitution. He also stressed that dialogue on the basis of the Constitution — not force — was the only option for resolving the dispute between the federal Government and the Kurdistan Regional Government, and he refused to hold talks on the results of the referendum or on independence.

7. On 27 September, the Council of Representatives declared that the referendum was unconstitutional, null and void, and adopted a resolution endorsing measures against the Kurdistan region of Iraq. In the resolution, the Council of Representatives called upon the Prime Minister, inter alia, to take all constitutional and legal measures to preserve the unity of Iraq; to deploy Iraqi security forces to areas under their control prior to June 2014; to reclaim oil fields in Kirkuk Governorate and disputed territories and return them to the control of the Government of Iraq; and to relocate foreign diplomatic missions in the Kurdistan region of Iraq to other areas of the country. On 28 September, the Kurdistan Regional Government rejected the resolution of the Council of Representatives, described the measures as “collective punishment of the Kurdish nation” and pledged to pursue an appeal. On 30 September, the Prime Minister issued a statement reassuring the people of the Kurdistan region of Iraq that the federal Government would uphold their equal rights and that the measures were not punitive, but were meant to prevent the illicit movement of people and goods.

8. International reaction to the referendum was swift. While expressing disappointment that the referendum had been held and that it lacked legitimacy, the majority of statements noted with concern the ensuing risks of instability in the country and in the region, and expressed support for the constitutionally mandated role of the central Government, and for the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq. Many of the statements also urged all sides to exercise calm and restraint, refrain from provocative statements and actions, engage constructively in a respectful dialogue and cooperation on all outstanding issues between Baghdad and Erbil within the framework of the Constitution and abide by the rulings of the federal Supreme Court.

9. In the lead-up to the referendum, political actors in Baghdad took steps to challenge its legality, including the insistence by the President of the Kurdistan region of Iraq that the referendum be held in Kirkuk Governorate and other disputed areas. On 18 July, the Prime Minister informed the Kirkuk Provincial Council that a referendum could not be held in Kirkuk, given that article 140 of the Constitution of Iraq had not yet been implemented. On 17 August, the Baghdad Administrative Court ruled that the decision of 28 March by the Kirkuk Provincial Council to fly the flag of the Kurdistan region of Iraq in front of government buildings in Kirkuk and at official occasions was illegal. On 29 August, the Kirkuk Provincial Council decided that the Governorate would participate in the referendum, in a session boycotted by Council members from Turkmen and Arab political parties. On 14 September, the Council of Representatives voted to dismiss the Governor of Kirkuk, Najmaldin Karim. The decision was rejected by the Governor and members of the Kurdistan Regional Government.

10. On 12 September, the Council of Representatives voted to reject the referendum as unconstitutional and called for all measures necessary to prevent the referendum and preserve the unity of Iraq as well as to promote dialogue and the resolution of all pending issues in accordance with the Constitution. No member of the Kurdistan Alliance took part in the vote.

11. In response to several complaints against the referendum, including a formal request by the Prime Minister, the federal Supreme Court issued an order on 18 September to halt the referendum until it had ruled on its legality, but did not touch on the substantive question of the constitutionality of the referendum. On 29 September, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, through his representative in Karbala’, called upon Baghdad and Erbil to uphold the Constitution.

12. Prior to the referendum, Mr. Al-Abadi repeatedly underscored that the decision to conduct the referendum was unconstitutional and illegal and could not be adopted unilaterally by the Kurdistan Regional Government. Instead, he emphasized that dialogue was the only mechanism for resolving all outstanding issues between Baghdad and Erbil and ruled out the use of force to stop the referendum. For his part, Mr. Barzani consistently stated that Iraqi Kurds had a legitimate right to selfdetermination and articulated a vision of an independent Kurdistan. He and other authorities in the Kurdistan Regional Government frequently repeated that the referendum would not result in immediate independence, but would help start negotiations with the federal Government on how to live together as good neighbours.

13. To postpone the referendum, Mr. Barzani demanded international guarantees that eventual independence would be accepted. On 22 September, he said it was too late to postpone the referendum and that further dialogue with Baghdad would resume only after the vote. On the eve of the referendum, Mr. Al-Abadi and Mr. Barzani repeated that the forces under their control — the Iraqi security forces and the Peshmerga, respectively — would not engage in any offensive actions.

14. A number of regional and international actors, including China, France, Iran (Islamic Republic of), the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of Ame rica, the European Union, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, voiced their concerns about the referendum or rejected it as such, and confirmed their support for the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and for dialogue between Baghdad and Erbil on all issues. On 21 September, the Security Council issued a statement to the press in which it expressed concern about the potentially destabilizing impact of the referendum.

15. On 9 September, during a visit to Iraq, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, expressed support for the unity of Iraq, called for dialogue and requested that the referendum be postponed. On 26 August, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of the Armed Forces of France, JeanYves Le Drian and Florence Parly, visited Baghdad and Erbil and underscored the support of France for the unity of Iraq. In telephone conversations with Mr. Al-Abadi and Mr. Barzani, on 4 and 10 August respectively, the United States Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, emphasized the need to focus on defeating Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and stabilizing Iraq, and reaffirmed the support of the United States for a unified, federal and democratic Iraq. On 22 September, the National Security Council of Turkey stated that the planned referendum was illegitimate and unacceptable and again warned of grave consequences. It stated that Turkey reserved all its rights emanating from bilateral and international agreements if the referendum were held. Iraq, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Turkey coordinated their responses to the referendum, as confirmed by their respective Ministers for Foreign Affairs at a meeting on the margins of the General Assembly on 20 September, when Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Turkey pledged to support Iraq.

16. A high-level delegation representing the High Council on the Referendum, a body created by the President of the Kurdistan region of Iraq in June, visited Baghdad from 14 to 21 August, where it met with members of the federal Government, including the President of Iraq, Fuad Masum, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the Council of Representatives, Salim al-Jubouri, and the Vice-President of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, as well as the ambassadors of Iran (Islamic Republic of),
Turkey and the United States, and my Special Representative. While the need for dialogue between Baghdad and Erbil had been emphasized, it nevertheless failed to materialize.

17. On 14 September, my Special Representative, the Special Presidential Envoy of the United States for the International Coalition to Counter ISIL, Brett McGurk, the Ambassador of the United States to Iraq, Douglas Silliman, and the Ambassador of the United Kingdom to Iraq, Frank Baker, proposed to the President of the Kurdistan region of Iraq meaningful negotiations on all the issues relating to Baghdad-Erbil relations as an alternative to the referendum. On 17 September, the High Council for the Referendum officially rejected the proposal.

18. On 23 September, Mr. Barzani sent another high-level delegation to Baghdad, with a mandate to restate the position of the Kurdistan Regional Government regarding the referendum and to convey the message that it would be ready to start negotiations, but only after the referendum, in order to start building the foundation for good-neighbourly relations. The delegation met with representatives of the Iraqi National Forces Alliance, who rejected such negotiations after the referendum.

Mr. Al-Abadi refused to meet the delegation.

19. Throughout the reporting period, several parties in the Kurdistan region of Iraq continued to insist on the reactivation of the Regional Parliament. On 15 September, the Regional Parliament reconvened for the first time since October 2015, during which it tasked the Kurdistan Independent High Electoral and Referendum Commission with organizing the referendum. The session was boycotted by the Movement for Change (Gorran) and the Kurdistan Islamic Group. In a legislative session on 30 September that was also boycotted by those two groups, the Regional Parliament adopted a resolution calling for the implementation of the referendum outcome and changed the name of the High Council for the Referendum to the Kurdistan Political Leadership-Iraq. On 2 October, the Movement for Change (Gorran) called for the abolishment of Kurdistan Political Leadership -Iraq and urged Baghdad and Erbil to engage in dialogue within the framework of the Constitution.

20. The Council of Representatives made limited progress on key electoral legislation. On 7 August, it voted on amendments to the Law on Provincial and District Council Elections (Law No. 36 of 2008, as amended), including the formula used for allocating seats, which is a matter of political and public debate, as smaller parties demand a provision that allows for their representation. Other articles that have been adopted provisionally include those that authorize the holding of elections to the Provincial Councils and the Council of Representatives concurrently; abolish subdistrict council elections; and extend the terms of the current Provincial Councils until the next election.

21. New political parties and alliances were formed during the reporting period.
On 15 July, the Speaker of the Council of Representatives and members of the Sunni-led Iraqi National Forces Coalition announced the establishment of the Iraqi National Forces Alliance, an umbrella organization of mostly Sunni Arab actors. On 24 July, the Chairman of the Iraqi National Forces Alliance and Chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Ammar al-Hakim, announced the establishment of a new political party, the National Wisdom Movement, and assumed its chairmanship. On 18 August, the Speaker convened the founding conference of the Civil Society for Reform Party, which proclaimed a cross-sectarian agenda.
Although his tenure as Chairman of the Iraqi National Forces Alliance expired on 5 September, Mr. Al-Hakim retained his position pending the appointment of a successor.

22. On 20 July, the Governor of Salah al-Din, Ahmed al-Jubouri, was convicted of misusing authority and federal funds, which resulted in the appointment of an interim Governor. On the same day, the Governor of Anbar, Suhaib al-Rawi, was dismissed by the Provincial Council after being charged with corruption. On 10 August, the Governor of Basrah, Majid al-Nasrawi, resigned after a warrant had been issued for his arrest on corruption charges. On 12 September, the Chairman of the Basrah Provincial Council, Sabah Hassan al-Bazouni, was convicted of bribery, but remains in his post pending sentencing.